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ETHICAL FIREWALLS, LIMITED 
ADMISSIBILITY, AND RULE 703 
Daniel D. Blinka*
INTRODUCTION 
At first look, it seems a straightforward proposition:  lawyers should not 
introduce inadmissible evidence.  Trial lawyers who do so are behaving 
unethically or unprofessionally in some sense.  But in what sense?  The 
term “unethical” is certainly problematic, but less appreciated are the 
perplexing issues involving “admissibility,” an ambiguity that begets ethical 
ambivalence in the modern adversary trial.1
Assume that our plaintiff’s case essentially turns on a single, brief 
hearsay statement.2  We will argue for its admissibility under several 
hearsay exceptions, but each one is problematic.  Nonetheless, if opposing 
counsel misses the hearsay objection (unlikely but not unimaginable), or if 
the judge accepts just one of the tenuous exceptions, the hearsay evidence is 
admitted.  And what if the judge rules the hearsay inadmissible?  Modern 
evidence rules, we know, permit experts to base opinion testimony even on 
inadmissible bases, provided they are of a type reasonably relied upon.  
Thus, our retained expert will testify on direct examination that the hearsay 
is the type of information upon which she usually relies in drawing 
professional opinions and inferences.  We will ask the judge to allow our 
expert to discuss the “otherwise inadmissible” hearsay for the limited 
purpose of explaining her reasoning and opinion, not for its truth. 
In sum, the ethical trial lawyer is provided two redoubts by evidence law.  
First, the fundamentals of trial procedure obligate the opponent to object in 
a timely and proper manner to the hearsay itself and to each proffered 
exception.  Evidence is not inadmissible until the judge rules it so based 
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.  I thank the Fordham Law Review 
and Professor Daniel Capra for the kind invitation to participate in this Symposium.  A 
research grant by Marquette Law School, for which I thank Dean Joseph D. Kearney, greatly 
assisted this essay’s preparation. 
 1. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct 18(g) (1994) (“A 
lawyer should not attempt to get before the jury evidence which is improper.  In all cases in 
which a lawyer has any doubt about the propriety of any disclosures to the jury, a request 
should be made for leave to approach the bench and obtain a ruling out of the jury’s hearing, 
either by propounding the question and obtaining a ruling or by making an offer of proof.”).  
The standard’s use of the word “improper,” rather than “inadmissible,” highlights the 
conceptual and ethical ambiguity inherent in modern evidence law. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 125–51 (discussing examples drawn from case 
law). 
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(almost always) on an objection.  Second, the doctrine of limited 
admissibility allows proponents to avoid exclusionary rules by offering the 
evidence for a permissible purpose, a procedure that can be readily abused, 
especially with expert (witness) assistance. 
Distinguished commentators have lamented that modern trial practice, 
particularly the limited admissibility doctrine, risks turning evidence rules 
“into something resembling the Internal Revenue Code with fancy 
loopholes for a favored few.”3  Nor is this hyperbole.  The remark, rather, 
insightfully reflects that the adversary ethic governs not just the 
presentation of proof, but also how evidence rules are used at trial. 
This essay’s first section provides an overview of multiple admissibility, 
which is the foundation of modern evidence law.  Its corollary, limited 
admissibility, permits lawyers to offer evidence for one purpose even if the 
rules preclude its use for others.  Trial procedures governing these doctrines 
contemplate an adversarial use of the rules themselves, inviting parties to 
evade or ignore exclusionary rules.  In sum, doctrine, policy, and 
procedures combine to create ethical firewalls for lawyers introducing 
otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
Limited admissibility is hardwired into modern evidence law.  The 
second section of this essay offers a brief overview of how the doctrine 
permeates the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Limited admissibility is integral 
to the very idea of relevant evidence, liberally used in a host of rules 
governing special aspects of relevancy, and so informs the definition of 
hearsay that it has assumed constitutional dimensions. 
In the third and fourth sections we turn to Rule 703, an innovative rule 
that sought to modernize trial practice by permitting experts to base 
opinions on the same type of information upon which they rely in their 
practices, callings, and professions, regardless of whether such information 
is admissible at trial.  Several cases vividly illustrate the doctrinal 
consternation that arises when experts rely on inadmissible evidence that 
the proponent wants placed before the jury to explain (ostensibly) the 
expert’s opinion and reasoning.  These “emerging problems” triggered Rule 
703’s amendment in 2000, a solution that explicitly embraced limited 
admissibility together with the often incoherent, ultimately inconsistent 
policies it serves.  The fourth section discusses how amended Rule 703 
provides an additional ethical firewall for counsel intent on exposing the 
jury to otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
The conclusion argues that we must rethink how limited admissibility is 
used in the Federal Rules of Evidence and at trial.  Distinctions 
painstakingly drawn in an evidence course are probably ill suited for trial.  
Moreover, we have need not only to recraft limiting instructions, but also to 
pay more attention to how lawyers may argue such evidence during their 
closing summations.  Finally, the essay concludes with suggestions for 
 3. 21A Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5062, at 246 (2d ed. 2005). 
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rethinking Rule 703 so that expert assistance is better reconciled with the 
often different imperatives governing the pursuit of truth in an adversary 
trial. 
I.  LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY AND ETHICS 
Limited admissibility is firmly ensconced in the modern law of evidence.  
Commentators have duly noted, however, its penchant for “mischief” in 
evading exclusionary rules of evidence.4  The discussion below first places 
limited admissibility in the broader context of multiple admissibility and the 
fundamentals of trial procedure.  The context is essential for understanding 
our second point:  limited admissibility is a key feature in an adversary 
ethic that permits lawyers to use rules to their client’s best advantage. 
A.  Multiple and Limited Admissibility:  Policy and Procedure 
Most evidence may be used to prove multiple factual propositions.5  For 
example, a witness is asked to testify that she received an e-mail stating that 
her company’s “chief financial officer (CFO) is manipulating financial 
statements in order to inflate the value of his stock options.”  The e-mail 
may be used to prove multiple propositions, including (1) the effect it had 
on the reader (e.g., why the witness called government regulators), (2) the 
declarant’s (the e-mail writer’s) belief that the CFO was manipulating the 
financials, whether correct or incorrect, and (3) the “fact” that the CFO had 
manipulated the company’s books.  Focusing just on hearsay, the e-mail’s 
admissibility turns on how it is used as evidence.6  Moreover, an 
opponent’s failure to object or to limit the e-mail’s evidentiary use means 
that it may be used to prove any and all reasonable inferences.7
The principle of multiple admissibility forms the core of modern 
evidence law.  Indeed the two are so inextricably interwoven that one 
distinguished commentator, Professor Kenneth Graham, Jr., quipped that 
the modern common law of evidence “spawned (or was spawned by)” 
multiple admissibility, an observation that also nicely captures their blurred 
origins in providing a rational (logical) foundation for proof at trial.8  
Multiple admissibility simply recognizes that “every piece of evidence 
supports numerous inferences.”9  The very concept of “relevant evidence,” 
 4. Id. § 5067, at 358; see infra text accompanying notes 49–60.  For the contention that 
the adversary ethic pervades the rules of evidence generally and contemplates the adversarial 
use of the rules themselves, see Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern 
Adversary Trial, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (2006). 
 5. See 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 242 (noting that “every piece of 
evidence supports numerous inferences”). 
 6. The hearsay issues are only the most obvious.  Documents also raise issues of 
authentication and the original writings rule. 
 7. See Paul C. Giannelli, Understanding Evidence § 6.02, at 68 (2d ed. 2006). 
 8. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 243.  Professor Kenneth Graham 
credits John Henry Wigmore with the term “multiple admissibility.” Id. 
 9. Id. § 5062, at 242. 
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as we will see, is keyed to the principle of multiple admissibility.10  
Difficulties quickly surface, however, when some, or even just one, of these 
inferences are forbidden by an evidentiary rule. 
Thus, it should come as little surprise that “[m]uch of the modern law of 
evidence doubtless emerged from efforts of judges and lawyers to cope with 
multiple inferences.”11  And there are a variety of ways to cope with the 
problem.  Suppose that testimony (e.g., our e-mail above) hosts inferences 
X, Y, and Z, yet only X is permitted by the rules.  One solution is to admit 
the evidence for all reasonable inferences:  the price we pay for inference X 
is the downside of inferences Y and Z.12  A second solution skews the 
balance in the opposite direction:  exclude the evidence completely, thereby 
eliminating the good (X) along with the bad (Y and Z).  Limited 
admissibility illuminates a third way:  admit the evidence for X but exclude 
its use for Y and Z, a seemingly reasonable, pragmatic, and enlightened 
solution that begets yet other problems.13
The policy underlying limited admissibility has long, deep roots in 
multiple admissibility, and it too is tightly interwoven into modern evidence 
law.14  The U.S. Supreme Court has elevated the doctrine to axiomatic 
status:15
But there is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony is 
admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is 
thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.  It would be 
a strange rule of law which held that relevant, competent evidence which 
tended to show [for example] bias on the part of a witness was 
nonetheless inadmissible because it also tended to show that the witness 
was a liar.16
Supporting limited admissibility is the policy of “admitting as much 
evidence as possible, despite the prejudice that may ensue to one of the 
parties from jury misuse of the evidence.”17  Some commentators see the 
doctrine as a “binary choice” between denying the proponent of needed, 
helpful evidence and subjecting her opponent to its likely “misuse.”18  Put 
differently, limited admissibility embodies a crude “cost-benefit formula” 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 63–75. 
 11. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 242 (citation omitted). 
 12. See id. § 5062, at 243 (discussing prior inconsistent statements). 
 13. Limited admissibility extends to parties as well as purposes.  Thus, evidence may be 
admissible against party A but not party B in a civil or criminal case.  For its typically 
thorough, insightful discussion, see 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5064.  While 
party-admissibility raises similar issues, our focus will be on evidence used for a limited 
purpose. 
 14. Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.02, at 97 (“The concept of limited admissibility is 
ingrained in evidence law.”).  The varying positions of evidence commentators are 
succinctly critiqued at 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 250–51. 
 15. See 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5063, at 254–55 (discussing Rule 105 in 
light of the common law and the principle of multiple admissibility). 
 16. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984). 
 17. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 253. 
 18. Id. 
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where the trial judge exercises discretion in weighing two quite imperfect 
alternatives.19
Although the policy strikes one as eminently reasonable on its face, the 
doctrine of limited admissibility is unsettled by its procedural features.  
First, there is the seemingly capricious way in which the doctrine is 
invoked.  Second, the principal method of enforcing the limited use of 
evidence, namely, a terse, often cryptic jury instruction, has richly earned 
the hackles and brickbats of courts and commentators for decades. 
First, limited admissibility is not self-executing under either Rule 105 or 
the common law; the burden usually falls on the opponent to raise the issue.  
The proponent, of course, may elect to raise the issue herself at trial or in a 
motion in limine, particularly where an objection is obvious or clearly 
anticipated.20  Yet this is purely a matter of proponent’s choice.  A judge 
may also intervene sua sponte (without objection or motion by the parties), 
but most judges are loathe to do so except in extraordinary circumstances.21  
Absent action by the proponent or the judge, the opponent must move to 
restrict the evidence or face the procedural consequences of default.22
Motions to restrict evidence under Rule 105 are closely related, 
functionally and procedurally, to objections under Rule 103.  Unless there is 
a timely and specific objection or request to limit the evidence by opposing 
counsel, “the trial judge commits no error by doing nothing.”23  In terms of 
timing, the request (or objection) normally should be made when the 
evidence is proffered regardless of whether the opponent is seeking to 
exclude it altogether,24 requesting a limiting instruction, or moving that 
proponent’s argument be restricted.25  The request, like an objection, 
should be reasonably specific.  Although opposing counsel need not have 
worked out the intricacies of a limiting instruction (assuming she wants 
one), the request should nonetheless notify the judge and proponent of the 
grounds upon which the evidence may be misused and its limited, 
permissible use.26  Of course, opposing counsel may just elect to object to 
 19. The policy underlying Rule 105 and limited admissibility is discussed in id. § 5062, 
at 245, 253. 
 20. Id. § 5065, at 326. 
 21. See id. § 5066.  Most trial judges are inclined to let the lawyers try their cases as they 
see fit.  A judge will likely intervene only when there is substantial risk of plain error. Id. § 
5066, at 341–44. 
 22. Id. § 5065, at 325–26; see also Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.05[A], at 102. 
 23. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5065, at 327. 
 24. Here the “request” takes the form of an objection.  The procedural minuet, as we 
shall see, often features the proponent then articulating a permissible purpose. See infra text 
accompanying notes 49–60. 
 25. See 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5065, at 335–37 (discussing the 
complications of the timing requirement depending on whether the proponent’s use was 
reasonably foreseeable and whether opposing counsel is seeking a limiting instruction or 
restrictions on counsel’s ability to argue the evidence).  Even if the opponent is undecided 
about when a limiting instruction should be read—then or at the close of the case—or 
undecided about even asking for one, the request for limitation should be made whenever the 
misuse of the evidence is reasonably foreseeable. 
 26. Id. § 5065, at 333. 
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the evidence and thereby force the proponent to articulate the permissible 
ground in an offer of proof.27  In sum, Rule 105 is not invoked unless 
requested by the parties.  Absent action by the proponent, the onus falls on 
opposing counsel. 
Doing nothing carries staggering procedural implications and imposes 
extraordinary costs on the opponent, whether the omission is deliberate 
(tactical) or inadvertent.  First, any error is waived on appeal unless it falls 
within the nether regions of plain error.  Second, and with grave 
implications for trial, the jury is free to use the evidence for any relevant 
purpose, which also means that the proponent may so argue in closing.  To 
continue with our e-mail example, the jury may use the evidence to infer 
facts X, Y, and Z absent a limiting ruling.  Third, and related, reviewing 
courts may rely on the evidence for any and all relevant inferences when 
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.28
Costs aside, opposing counsel may rationally decide that often it is just 
not worth the effort.  After all, the request (or objection) usually only serves 
to draw the jury’s attention to harmful evidence while underscoring 
counsel’s acknowledgment (the request) that the evidence hurts.  And 
assuming the judge grants the request, limited admissibility is enforced 
through two often unsatisfactory procedures.  First, the judge may give a 
limiting instruction.  Second, the judge’s ruling itself restricts how 
proponent may argue the evidence in closing summation.  We will discuss 
each in turn. 
The much maligned limiting instruction is often the prime remedy.29  
Perversely, it is the very ineffectiveness of the limiting instruction that may 
provide the opponent’s strongest argument against the limited use of the 
evidence.  If opposing counsel convinces the trial judge that the limiting 
instruction will not protect the affected party from unfair prejudice, the 
judge may exclude the evidence altogether under Rule 403.30  Nonetheless, 
limiting instructions are a timeworn, well-established feature of modern 
trials, their efficacy notwithstanding.  Their use is amply supported by the 
assumption (legal fiction?) that juries follow their instructions, an article of 
faith fiercely protected by a gag (Rule 606) that renders jurors incompetent 
to testify about their deliberations.31
 27. See id. § 5065, at 327–29 (discussing the interplay of Rules 103 and 105, particularly 
the use of objections to “smoke out the limited admissibility of the evidence”). 
 28. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 6.02, at 68; id. § 8.05[C], at 102–03; see also 21A 
Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5065. 
 29. Although the limiting instruction and restricted argument by counsel are the prime 
procedural remedies, the judge may consider others, including excluding the evidence. 21A 
Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 246 (noting that “trial courts have an extensive 
arsenal against prejudice that goes beyond popgun limiting instructions”); see also id. § 
5063.1, at 275–77 (listing other remedies). 
 30. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.06, at 103. 
 31. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see Giannelli, supra note 7, § 18.08.  To take an extreme 
example, even were all jurors to sign an affidavit to the effect that they collectively and 
deliberately ignored a limiting instruction and used the evidence for an improper purpose, 
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Rule 105 explicitly endorses limiting instructions while providing scant 
guidance about how a judge should balance probative value against 
prejudicial effect.32  The judge must give an instruction upon request, 
which must be timely (i.e., normally the request must coincide with the 
admission of the evidence itself unless its misuse was not reasonably 
foreseeable).33  The judge in her discretion may give a limiting instruction 
sua sponte, but the better authority strongly suggests that she consult with 
counsel, who may forego the cure because it is sometimes worse than the 
disease, despite the risk that the omission may result in a waiver on 
appeal.34  The timing of the instruction itself raises a further issue.  Counsel 
may demand that the instruction be given when the evidence is admitted, 
which is perhaps the “best time.”35  It may, however, be delayed (or 
repeated) during the closing charge to the jury.36  Finally, the form and 
content of the instruction depends, of course, on the evidentiary issue itself.  
The most helpful instructions tell the jury both how it can and cannot use 
the evidence in question.37
Courts and commentators have had a veritable field day questioning, 
criticizing, and often condemning limiting instructions as applied in 
particular cases and in general.  It may be that limiting instructions have 
inspired some of the most colorful commentary known to evidence law.  
One judge cracked that “‘if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can’t 
instruct the jury not to smell it.’”38  Judge Learned Hand observed that a 
limiting instruction “‘is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental 
gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s else.’”39  
And a final illustrative comment is from Justice Robert Jackson, who 
remarked upon “‘[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be 
unmitigated fiction.’”40  Justice Jackson may have placed too much 
Rule 606 would exclude the affidavit in favor of the fiction that the jury did indeed (if not in 
reality) follow the instruction. 
 32. See 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5063.1, at 271–75 (discussing the factors 
that the balancing approach weighs). 
 33. Id. § 5066, at 338–39; see also Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.05[A], at 102. 
 34. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5066, at 343–44; see also supra text 
accompanying note 28. 
 35. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5066, at 345.  The authority is also split over 
whether the instruction must precede the admission of the evidence or whether it may 
follow, and, if so, how near in time the instruction must be to the introduction of evidence.  
The wisest approach is to entrust these details to the judge’s discretion, requiring only that 
the instruction be “reasonably near” the evidence’s introduction. Id. § 5066, at 346–47; see 
also Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.05[B], at 102. 
 36. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5066, at 348. 
 37. Id. § 5066, at 351. 
 38. Id. § 5066, at 353 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 
1962)). 
 39. Id. (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
 40. Id. (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
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confidence in the trial bar’s (apparent) judgment, yet, to date, empirical 
studies have failed to sway the issue one way or the other.41
So why then do lawyers request limiting instructions?  First, despite the 
lack of empirical support, one hopes that jurors take the judge’s cautionary 
words to heart and try their best to keep the evidence in harness.  
Sometimes, however, the distinction between the permissible and 
impermissible uses of evidence is strained to the point of credulity, so why 
would a lawyer request a limiting instruction under these circumstances?  
This points to a second, more compelling reason for making the request:  a 
failure to request a limiting instruction may be treated as a waiver of the 
issue on appeal.42  Yet, here too, we see the proverbial two-edged sword.  
Appellate courts often point to such instructions, and the “fiction” that the 
jury followed them, in finding that evidence was properly admitted for a 
limited purpose. 
Regardless of limiting instructions, Rule 105 commands the trial judge to 
“restrict the evidence to its proper scope.”43  Less abstractly, Rule 105 
limits how the lawyers, judge, and jury may use the evidence.  The 
proponent is limited to whatever purpose (or against whichever party) the 
evidence is admitted because “she is the lawyer most tempted to abuse the 
doctrine.”44  Yet so also is the opposing party (who probably requested the 
limitation in the first instance).  In terms of trial practice, the restriction 
limits how the parties’ lawyers may argue the evidence during their closing 
summations.45  Judges are similarly bound by their own rulings, whether 
serving as the trier of fact in a bench trial or assessing the sufficiency of 
evidence in motions after verdict.46  Juries are also theoretically restricted 
in their use of the evidence, most often through the tool of limiting 
instructions but also through a judge’s power to comment on the evidence, 
assuming the judge has such authority.47
 41. Id. § 5066, at 353–54 (discussing and criticizing the empirical studies of limiting 
instructions).  See generally Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional Juror, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1609 
(2007); Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Hearsay:  The Influence of “Secondhand” 
Information on Jurors’ Decisions, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 345 (1995). 
 42. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 8.05[C], at 102–03; see also 21A Wright & Graham, 
supra note 3, § 5065, at 327–28 (“[I]f the trial court overrules the [opponent’s] objection, the 
opponent cannot stand on the objection if the evidence is arguably admissible for a limited 
purpose; she must request a limiting instruction to force the limited purpose into the open.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 43. Fed. R. Evid. 105. 
 44. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5067, at 355 (“The proponent who gets 
evidence in for a limited purpose is bound by the representation that admitted the 
evidence . . . .”). 
 45. See id. § 5067, at 355–58 (discussing the “mischief” that lawyers on all sides may 
generate in civil and criminal trials). 
 46. Id. § 5067, at 358–59. 
 47. Id. § 5067, at 359–60. 
  
2007] FIREWALLS, ADMISSIBILITY, AND RULE 703 1237 
 
B.  Ethical Considerations 
Murky legal doctrine, conflicted policies, and capricious procedures 
guarantee that ethical issues involving limited admissibility will be 
similarly contorted.  In many ways, limited admissibility serves the ends of 
both those evading the smothering effect of exclusionary rules of evidence 
as well as those seeking to smother the other.  The purpose of this section is 
to identify and track ethical implications that are present whenever limited 
admissibility is invoked, but also with an eye toward Rule 703, which we 
will discuss later in this essay.48
The doctrine’s penchant for lawyerly “mischief” is clearly present.49  
Professor Graham observes that limited admissibility “means that if the 
proponent can find a single legitimate purpose, the evidence is admissible 
even though his opponent can find ten improper purposes for which the 
evidence might be used.”50  With some hyperbole, Graham continues, 
In short, all that stands between a party and his opponent’s high-priced (or 
unscrupulous) lawyer’s imaginative evasion of the Evidence Rules is a 
limiting instruction.  Indeed, if the judge is biased or stupid, the lawyer 
does not have to be particularly bright—so long as he represents someone 
the judge likes.51
Nor is the mischief confined to purpose limitations.  For example, one 
“sneak[y] tactic” involves joining an uninsured party to an action, eliciting 
her damaging admission, and “then dismissing her from the action in hopes 
that the trial court will not grant a mistrial to avoid prejudice to the 
remaining deep pockets.”52
Abuses—assuming that is the right word—are not, however, confined to 
the unscrupulous and the sneaky; rather, limited admissibility is an open 
invitation to evade or ignore exclusionary bars to evidence.  Proponents are 
the usual suspects when naming likely offenders.53  Yet opposing counsel is 
hardly a hapless victim; the doctrine permits the exclusion of evidence that 
might very well be admissible for several permissible uses.  For instance, 
opposing counsel may object to evidence with the (silent) knowledge that 
there are several permissible, limited uses of the evidence of which the 
inexperienced or inept proponent is unaware.  If the judge sustains the 
objection, neither opposing counsel nor the judge is under any obligation to 
educate the proponent about other theories of admissibility.54  In sum, the 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 112–24. 
 49. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5067, at 358. 
 50. Id. § 5062, at 245. 
 51. Id. § 5062, at 245–46.  My only quibble with Graham’s characterization is that 
limited admissibility’s mischief is open to all comers, not just the unscrupulous and the 
overpaid. 
 52. Id. § 5067, at 357–58. 
 53. Id. § 5067, at 355 (noting that the proponent “is the lawyer most tempted to abuse 
the doctrine”). 
 54. Blinka, supra note 4, at 36–37. 
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byzantine procedural complexities of the doctrine invite aggressive use of 
evidence rules by both proponents and opponents. 
Ethical questions most often surface, however, when the proponent seeks 
to sidestep exclusionary rules through purpose limitations, which 
immediately implicates proponent’s motives.  Consider a simple hearsay 
problem.  Does proponent really want to introduce the e-mail about the 
CFO’s peculations (our example above) to show why the e-mail reader 
went to government regulators (permissible), or does she secretly hope that 
the jury will use it as proof that “in fact” the CFO engaged in such 
misconduct (not permissible), regardless of the judge’s instructions?  The 
short answer is that admissibility does not turn on the lawyer’s motives or 
unarticulated (at least on the record) tactical thinking.55
Although some lawyers undoubtedly abuse the doctrine, it is a doctrine 
that nonetheless invites abuse and sharp practice by harboring distinctions 
that are often questionable and sometime just plain meaningless.  Moreover, 
its procedures are truly a “trap for the unwary,” whether proponent or 
opponent.56  The rules of professional responsibility largely default to the 
law of evidence regarding questions of admissibility.57  Waiver rules, as we 
have seen, guarantee that an opponent’s failure to object or to request a 
limiting instruction renders the evidence admissible for all relevant 
purposes.58  More concretely, this places the onus on opposing counsel to 
anticipate potential misuses of evidence and to timely request a restriction 
on its use.59  Meanwhile, the proponent is not under any duty to alert the 
court, much less opposing counsel, to potential pitfalls or to offer the 
evidence for a permissible purpose in the first instance.  And when 
confronted by a timely objection, the proponent may resort to an ostensible 
permissible purpose even if she harbors the secret hope that the jury will 
nonetheless use it for an improper purpose, regardless of the judge’s 
instructions.  The evasion is most troubling, and perhaps the easiest to 
effect, when the distinctions between the permissible and impermissible 
purposes are vague, overlapping, or simply nonsensical. 
In sum, the doctrine of limited admissibility enthusiastically embraces 
the adversary ethic by permitting trial lawyers to use evidence rules to their 
 55. See J. Alexander Tanford, The Trial Process:  Law, Tactics and Ethics 211 (3d ed. 
2002) [hereinafter Tanford, Trial Process] (arguing that “[y]ou may not include in your 
direct examination evidence which is not admissible” and, even further against the grain, 
“you may not include evidence that you think is not admissible”); see also J. Alexander 
Tanford, The Ethics of Evidence, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 487 (2002).  My critique of 
Tanford’s high-minded but ultimately unworkable “good faith” principle may be found at 
Blinka, supra note 4, at 39–42. 
 56. See 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 254. 
 57. Blinka, supra note 4, at 7–11. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-
Related Ethics Provisions “Law”?, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1315 (2007). 
 58. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
 59. Good trial lawyers understand that trials are not final examinations in evidence 
courses.  Objections are usually kept to the minimum and reserved for particularly troubling 
evidence.  In sum, the mind set is never to object reflexively and appear obstructionist. See, 
e.g., Tanford, Trial Process, supra note 55, at 184–87. 
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best advantage at trial.60  As we will see in the next section, the doctrine 
permeates modern evidence law. 
II.  LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The doctrines of multiple admissibility and limited admissibility are 
threaded throughout the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In numerous instances 
a “rule excludes evidence only for one purpose while explicitly or implicitly 
permitting its use for other purposes.”61  By no means is limited 
admissibility cabined in Rule 105; rather, the doctrine is structural, forming 
the core of modern evidence law.  A brief survey underscores how 
pervasively these doctrines define and delimit nearly all key evidentiary 
rules.62
The relevancy rules and so-called quasi-privileges ensconced in article 
IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence provide many of the most dramatic 
examples and difficult problems.  The concept of relevant evidence openly 
embraces the principle of multiple admissibility, and specialized relevancy 
rules are textbook illustrations of limited admissibility. 
The concept of relevancy is “the threshold issue for all evidence.”63  
Evidence that is not relevant is excluded.64  Relevant evidence is admissible 
unless otherwise excluded by the rules.65  Under Rule 401 evidence is 
relevant if it has any tendency to make a consequential proposition more or 
less likely.66  The definition has two elements.  Consequential propositions 
are delimited by the substantive law and the pleadings; their range may be 
expanded or contracted depending on what claims, defenses, or criminal 
charges are filed.67  The only limitations are counsel’s imagination (and 
learning) and the law governing frivolous claims and defenses.68  Yet 
multiple admissibility is truly given effect through the “any tendency” 
element, which governs the relationship between the evidence and the 
factual proposition it is offered to prove.  As long as the evidence has “any 
tendency” to make that proposition more or less likely, it is relevant.  The 
tendency may be grounded in life experiences and common sense; it is not 
an arid exercise in logic nor is it confined to case law precedent.  The 
factual proposition may be just a tenuous link in a circumstantial chain 
because, as the advisory committee put it, “[a] brick is not a wall.”69  Rule 
 60. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5062, at 254 (“Rule 105 genuflects toward 
traditional notions of party autonomy . . . .”). 
 61. Id. § 5063, at 256. 
 62. This survey is eclectic, not exhaustive.  For another survey that also makes the point 
that limited admissibility pervades the federal rules, see 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 
3, § 5063. 
 63. Giannelli, supra note 7, § 9.01, at 107. 
 64. Fed. R. Evid. 402. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 
 67. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 9.02, at 108–10. 
 68. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
 69. Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s note (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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401, then, “sets the bar very low.”70  It recognizes that “[t]he law furnishes 
no test of relevancy”71 and for that very reason accords trial lawyers great 
leeway in deciding how to best prove their cases and vests trial judges with 
broad discretion in determining whether evidence has any probative 
value.72
The interrelationship of relevancy and limited admissibility is readily 
apparent.  Evidence may be expressly barred for factual proposition Z, but 
as long as it has “any tendency” to make consequential proposition X more 
or less likely, it is relevant and hence admissible under Rule 402. 
Limited admissibility, as we have seen, implicates Rule 403, which 
authorizes the judge to exclude relevant evidence where its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury.73  For present purposes it is enough to observe that 
Rule 403, like Rule 402, is strongly biased in favor of admissibility.  The 
judge may exclude the evidence only if the “dangers” (e.g., unfair 
prejudice) substantially outweigh its probative value.  A hesitant judge 
inclined to admit evidence for a limited purpose may draw comfort from the 
legion of case law holding that limiting instructions adequately safeguard 
the trial process.74
In sum, Rules 401 through 403 are the collective embodiment of 
“assumptive admissibility.”75  Evidence that passes the exceedingly low 
threshold of relevancy should be weighed by the trier of fact.  And the 
flaccid conceptualization of relevancy usually means that creative counsel 
can conjure some consequential proposition for which the evidence has 
“any” probative value. 
Other specialized rules of relevancy explicitly embrace limited 
admissibility and carry with them a vast, often realized, potential for 
lawyerly “mischief.”  Rule 404(a) broadly precludes use of a person’s 
character trait to show that he or she acted in conformity with that trait on a 
particular occasion, the so-called propensity inference.  The rule effectively 
means that prosecutors cannot offer evidence of the defendant’s bad 
character in criminal cases, and in civil cases neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant may draw upon the character-propensity inference.76  Thus, 
 70. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1190 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 71. James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 265 
(Rothman Reprints 1969) (1898). 
 72. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory committee’s note. 
 73. Fed. R. Evid. 403; see supra text accompanying notes 11–19; see also Giannelli, 
supra note 7, § 9.05[B][1], at 121 (“In addition to an appeal to emotion, unfair prejudice 
[under Rule 403] may involve the risk that a jury will use evidence improperly, despite a 
limiting instruction.”). 
 74. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31. 
 75. Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 2.4, at 34 (3d ed. 1996). 
 76. In civil cases there are instances in which a person’s character is itself an element of 
the claim or defense.  For example, in claims for negligent hiring, supervision, or 
entrustment, the plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or should have known that 
the employee in question was a bad driver.  Rule 404(a) does not bar this use of evidence 
and also has three exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).  The first two apply in criminal cases 
  
2007] FIREWALLS, ADMISSIBILITY, AND RULE 703 1241 
 
evidence that a person is “careless” or a “bad driver” cannot be used to 
prove his or her negligence in a car crash. 
Yet Rule 404(b) expressly permits other act evidence to prove something 
other than character and conduct in conformity.  Its dubious distinction as 
the “most litigated” evidence issue bespeaks the rule’s potential for 
mischief.77  For the unmotivated trial lawyer, Rule 404(b) includes a long 
laundry list of permissible “other” purposes for which this explosive 
evidence may be used.  In criminal cases, prosecutors frequently proffer 
(“sneak”?) evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts and criminal conduct 
not to prove his bad character (and hence guilt), but ostensibly to prove 
other propositions, such as motive, opportunity, plan, intent, and the like.78  
Often the real difficulty is that the distinction between the permissible 
purpose and the forbidden character inference is strained or nonexistent.  
Prior crimes offered to show defendant’s identity or the requisite mental 
state (intent) may look and feel very much like forbidden character 
evidence.79
Civil litigation yields many similar examples of abuse and mischief.  
Assume the plaintiff claims that the tortfeasor was drunk and failed to yield 
right of way in an automobile collision.  In a run-of-the-mill negligence 
action, the tortfeasor’s prior drunk driving conviction is inadmissible to 
show that she is a “drunk” driver.  But by pleading punitive damages, the 
plaintiff may then argue that the prior drunk driving episode, in which the 
tortfeasor struck and killed a young child, is admissible to prove that she 
should have known about the dangers of drinking and driving on this 
occasion as well.80  Instruct the jury as you will, it is likely that the jury 
may be tempted also to use the prior drunk driving as some proof that she 
was drunk and failed to yield right of way in the underlying negligence 
action. 
Rule 404(b) is hardly an aberration.  The quasi-privileges throughout 
article IV are modeled on a similar template:  a broad rule of exclusion 
followed by exceptions for limited purposes.  Rule 407 excludes evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures when used to prove negligence or 
culpable conduct.81  Such evidence is, however, admissible to prove other 
factual propositions, such as ownership, control, and feasibility, as well as 
impeachment, when relevant.  Rule 408 protects and promotes settlement 
talks by excluding evidence of compromises and offers to compromise 
and permit a criminal defendant to prove his, or the victim’s, character for propensity 
purposes.  The third exception permits impeachment of a witness’s truthful character. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 608; Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
 77. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 11.01, at 163. 
 78. Id. § 11.03, at 165 (noting that “this tactic is often a subterfuge for sneaking 
character evidence before the jury”).  Professor Paul Giannelli strongly suggests that the list 
be deleted from Rule 404(b) because it has engendered “difficult[ies]” when prosecutors use 
it as a laundry list of reasons for evading the character evidence ban. Id. 
 79. See 22 Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5242, at 591. 
 80. See Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 855–56 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 81. Fed. R. Evid. 407. 
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when offered to prove the validity of a disputed claim or amount.82  Yet 
evidence of compromise, for example, may be used to prove bias, to negate 
a contention of undue delay, to prove obstruction of justice, or for any other 
relevant purpose.  Rule 409 protects “Good Samaritans” by excluding 
evidence that a party offered, promised, or actually paid medical and similar 
expenses to prove liability for the underlying injury.83  Again, the same 
evidence may be used to prove some other relevant proposition.  A final 
example suffices.  Rule 411 forecloses the tenuous (yet relevant) inference 
that because one carried or failed to carry liability insurance, one is 
negligent or otherwise liable.84  The fact of insurance may, however, be 
used to prove ownership, agency, or bias. 
Special rules of limited admissibility are also present in article VI, which 
governs witnesses.  Two rules from that article will be briefly discussed.  
Both rules concern impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness 
and fully embody the foibles of limited admissibility.  Rule 608(b) provides 
that any witness, including a party, may be cross-examined about specific 
instances of untruthful conduct, such as false statements on college 
applications, puffery in resumes, and outright fraud.85  In theory the 
evidence is narrowly confined to deficiencies in the witness’s truthful 
character from which the jury may infer that the witness is lying at trial.  
There is, of course, considerable chance that the witness’s prior frauds, 
deceit, and lies will be used to infer simply that the witness is also a “bad 
person,” or a “crook,” a particularly grave risk for parties.  Yet the case law 
unerringly reposes discretion in trial judges to guard against unfair 
prejudice by limiting cross-examination where appropriate and by “giving 
limiting instructions.”86  Rule 609 carries even greater potential for 
unfairness, as it permits impeachment of witnesses, including parties, with 
prior criminal convictions.87  Federal courts typically allow evidence of 
“the particular felony charged, the date, and the disposition of a prior 
conviction for impeachment purposes.”88  Less clear is “why information 
about the nature of a witness’s felony conviction is relevant” to 
credibility.89  Some courts are forthright in their bewilderment over the 
rule: 
 The implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior felony convictions 
have probative value.  Their probative value, however, necessarily varies 
 82. Fed. R. Evid. 408.  Another rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 410, promotes plea 
discussions in criminal cases. 
 83. Fed. R. Evid. 409. 
 84. Fed. R. Evid. 411. 
 85. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 22.09, at 279–81.  See generally Gerald L. Shargel, 
Federal Evidence Rule 608(b):  Gateway to the Minefield of Witness Preparation, 76 
Fordham L. Rev. 1263 (2007). 
 86. E.g., United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 621 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 87. Fed. R. Evid. 609. 
 88. United States v. Smith, 454 F.3d 707, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  The 
rule applies in civil as well as criminal cases. Id. 
 89. United States v. Howell, 285 F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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with their nature and number. . . . We are not certain what evidence of two 
convictions for theft by taking, one conviction for armed robbery, and one 
conviction for aggravated assault says about [the witness’s] credibility, 
but we are certain that the jury should have been given the opportunity to 
make that decision.90
While such candor is refreshing, it should give us pause about how 
seriously courts scrutinize limiting instructions. 
Modern hearsay doctrine adheres to the same pattern.  The starting point 
is the definition of hearsay itself.  Most jurisdictions embrace some variant 
of Rule 801(c), which provides that “‘[h]earsay’ is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”91  Manifestly, there is 
nothing wrong with using hearsay evidence, which parties frequently do in 
all sorts of trials.  Rule 802 excludes hearsay evidence unless it falls within 
any one of the more than three dozen exceptions to the rule.92  And while 
the wide range of exceptions provides entry gates for a sweeping variety of 
hearsay, they are not boundless.  For this reason, trial lawyers seeking to 
admit this evidence often turn to the seemingly straightforward definition of 
hearsay itself.  The goal is simple:  if I cannot find a workable exception, 
perhaps I can define my way out of hearsay in the first place. 
Hearsay is conceptualized in terms of limited admissibility.93  The term 
“statement” is defined as a verbal or nonverbal assertion of fact or opinion 
(other than one made while on the witness stand).94  Whether a “statement” 
constitutes “hearsay” under Rule 801(c) depends, however, on what the 
proponent is using it to prove, thus, implicating limited admissibility.  Only 
when the statement is offered “in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted” is it hearsay.95  Conversely, if the proponent offers the statement 
for any other relevant purpose it is, by definition, not hearsay and, hence, 
admissible unless excluded by some other rule. 
The case law has identified three principle nonhearsay purposes.  First, 
statements that trigger legal rights or duties under substantive law are 
admissible for that reason alone under the verbal acts (or operative facts) 
doctrine, as, for instance, when used to show whether the conveyance of 
 90. United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 91. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 
 92. Fed. R. Evid. 802. 
 93. A “declarant” is defined as a “person.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(b).  Although seemingly 
straightforward, “declarant” so defined eliminates from hearsay’s reach a wide range of 
communications, particularly those that are machine produced, such as the cash-register 
receipt generated by a store’s scanner. 
 94. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a).  Critical, then, is whether the declarant intended to 
communicate (assert) a fact or opinion.  Verbal utterances that are in the form of a question 
(“How are you today?”) or an imperative (“Stop!”) are not assertions, so long as they do not 
also contain an assertion of fact (“Stop, there’s a truck coming!”).  Nonverbal conduct is not 
hearsay unless the declarant intended it as a communication, as when a victim literally points 
to a suspect in a lineup.  To take another classic example, a person who opens an umbrella 
when the rain starts is trying to stay dry, not warning the world that it is raining outside. 
 95. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 
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property was a gift or bailment.96  Second, the statement may be admissible 
for its effect on one who heard it (if oral) or read it (if written).  This 
purpose, often called “effect on listener/reader,” usually comes into play to 
show that a person had knowledge or notice of something.97  Third, a 
statement may be used for the nonhearsay purpose of proving the 
declarant’s thoughts or beliefs regarding the matter, irrespective of whether 
the facts are “true.”98  In theory, none of these purposes depend for their 
relevancy on the statement’s truth. 
Let us return to the earlier e-mail example, where the witness is asked to 
testify that she received an e-mail stating that her company’s CFO is 
manipulating financial statements in order to inflate the value of his stock 
options.  In a defamation suit brought by the CFO, the e-mail’s words may 
be tortious wholly apart from their truth—the verbal acts doctrine.  (Indeed 
the CFO will contend they are manifestly false.)  If used to explain why the 
witness reported the allegations to federal regulators, the statement is being 
used for its effect on the reader.  The statement may also be relevant to 
prove the declarant’s (the e-mail writer’s) knowledge or belief regarding the 
allegations, such as why he wrote an extortionate note to the CFO 
demanding payment in exchange for silence.  (Here too the truth of the 
allegations is not involved.)  Finally, the e-mail’s content may be used as 
evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, namely, the “fact” that the 
CFO manipulated the company’s books for personal gain. 
This discussion prompts several difficult questions.  First, how do we 
know which use the proponent is making of the statement?  The short 
answer is that the opponent must object on hearsay grounds in order to 
ferret out the purpose.  Absent a timely hearsay objection, the statement 
may be used for any relevant proposition, including its truth, regardless of 
whether a hearsay exception can be established.99  The important point for 
present purposes is that a lawyer intent on spilling the e-mail’s content 
before the jury, but who lacks even a colorable hearsay exception, may 
sidestep the hearsay quagmire by offering the statement for any of the 
nonhearsay purposes described above.  Of course relevancy may rear its 
head, but this is a separate objection that the opponent must timely make (or 
waive). 
Second, how will the jury distinguish between the permissible 
nonhearsay purpose (e.g., effect on reader) and the ostensibly prohibited 
inference of the statement’s factual accuracy?  The discerning reader knows 
the answer:  a limiting instruction.  We simply educate the jury about the 
distinctions between the truth of the matter asserted (red light) and the 
pertinent nonhearsay purpose (green light).  This time-honored solution is, 
however, even more fantastical in this context than in many others.  The 
 96. Giannelli, supra note 7, § 31.06[B], at 426 (noting that “the uttering of certain words 
carries independent legal significance under the substantive law”). 
 97. See id. § 31.06[A], at 424. 
 98. Id. § 31.06[E], at 429. 
 99. 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7009 (2006). 
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typical law school evidence course devotes significant instructional time 
and attention (e.g., class discussion, assigned reading) to these reified 
distinctions, yet at trial a three-sentence jury instruction often suffices. 
Prior inconsistent statements provide a convenient, recurring example.  
Assume a witness testifies to events in a manner dramatically at odds with 
what he told investigators before trial in an unsworn statement.  Under Rule 
801(d)(1)(A), his prior out-of-court statements may not be used for their 
truth because they were not given “under oath subject to the penalty of 
perjury.”100  Yet federal case law freely admits those very same statements 
for impeachment on the theory that they prove the witness once harbored 
different thoughts or beliefs about the subject matter, which in turn raises 
issues about the credibility of his testimony at trial.101  (Is he lying?  Is he 
mistaken?)  The potential for abuse on direct as well as cross-examination 
has been duly noted.102  Distinguishing between the statement’s use for 
impeachment purposes and its use to prove the truth of the matter asserted 
bedevils law students, lawyers, and judges.  One suspects it is altogether 
lost on the jury.103  The likely futility of a limiting instruction impelled 
many jurisdictions to erase the purported distinction, thereby permitting 
prior inconsistent statements for substantive use as well as for impeachment 
unqualified by the oath/perjury element.104
So ingrained is this practice of defining away the hearsay problem that it 
has been embraced as constitutional doctrine.  The Sixth Amendment 
confrontation right restricts the government’s use of hearsay against a 
criminal defendant, although the doctrine is unsettled.  From 1980 to 2004, 
the Supreme Court focused on reliability concerns in Ohio v. Roberts105 
 100. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).  On the difference between substantive and impeaching 
use of prior inconsistent statements, see Giannelli, supra note 7, § 31.06[D], at 428. 
 101. See Graham, supra note 99, § 7011, at 90. 
 102. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual § 801.02[3][a] (9th ed. 2006) (“There is a legitimate concern that clever 
lawyers may attempt to call witnesses solely to ‘impeach’ them with inconsistent statements 
in the hope that the jury will consider the inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.”).  
As the preceding quotation illustrates, the problem is not confined to cross-examination.  
Elsewhere the authors observe that often the direct examiner may have to impeach her own 
witness with a prior inconsistent statement. See id. § 607.02[2]–[3]. 
 103. But see United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
reversible error where the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the prior statements were 
admissible solely for impeachment purposes).  This case also illustrates how ingrained is the 
reliance on limiting instructions.  I am indebted for the citation to Saltzburg et al., supra note 
102, § 801.02[3][a]. 
 104. The original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence took this approach, but the rule 
was amended by Congress to include the oath/perjury element for substantive use.  Other 
jurisdictions permit both impeaching and substantive use of any prior inconsistent statement, 
provided the declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination. See 21A 
Wright & Graham, supra note 3, at 243 (using this example to illustrate how “problems arise 
when both permissible and impermissible inferences can be drawn from the same piece of 
evidence”). 
 105. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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and its progeny.106  The Court dramatically overhauled confrontation 
doctrine in Crawford v. Washington,107 a 2004 case that rebuked the 
Roberts reliability approach in favor of one (allegedly) truer to the right’s 
historic roots.  The confrontation right, explained the Court, applies only to 
“testimonial” hearsay, which the government may introduce only if the 
declarant testifies, subject to cross-examination, or is shown to be 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
her.108
For present purposes, what is significant is that since 1980, whether 
construing the now (largely) discarded Roberts reliability approach or the 
Crawford “testimonial” approach, the Court has insisted that the 
confrontation right applies only when the prosecution offers an out-of-court 
statement for purposes of proving the truth of the matter asserted.  In short, 
the definition of hearsay under evidence law triggers, or perhaps controls, 
the constitutional right of confrontation.  And that definition, of course, is 
governed by the principles, policies, and practices of limited admissibility.  
The Court first explicitly adopted this position in Tennessee v. Street,109 
where it upheld the prosecution’s use of an accomplice’s confession in a 
lynching case even though the accomplice did not testify.  The accomplice’s 
confession was not offered to prove its truth, that is, as evidence of the 
lynching itself.  Rather, the government offered it for purposes of showing 
discrepancies between the accomplice’s version and the defendant’s own 
confession, where defendant contended that police had falsely attributed the 
accomplice’s statement to him as well.110  Although Street was decided in 
the full flower of the Roberts reliability approach, the Court has expressly 
endorsed Street under its Crawford testimonial approach as well.111  Thus, 
if the government offers a prior statement for a relevant nonhearsay 
purpose, it falls outside the protections accorded testimonial hearsay under 
the Crawford doctrine. 
In this section we have seen that limited admissibility suffuses modern 
evidence law.  It forms the very core of relevancy.  It is relied upon to 
effectuate the public policy goals of the quasi-privileges.  It permeates 
impeachment doctrine.  And it has penetrated hearsay doctrine to the point 
 106. E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (limiting the prosecution’s duty to 
produce the declarant to instances where the hearsay is made in the course of a prior judicial 
proceeding); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (construing the reliability prong of the 
Roberts test). 
 107. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 108. In Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated 
upon the meaning of testimonial hearsay in light of 911 emergency calls and routine police 
contact with crime victims. 
 109. 471 U.S. 409, 413 (1985) (noting that the confrontation right is not triggered unless 
the out-of-court statement is “hearsay under traditional rules of evidence”). 
 110. Id. at 409 (noting in the case summary that the statement was used “not to prove 
what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when [defendant] 
confessed”). 
 111. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. 
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that the Court has accorded constitutional status to limited admissibility 
under the confrontation right. 
III.  THE ALCHEMY OF RULE 703 
Rule 703 may well represent the apogee of limited admissibility.112  For 
much the same reason, it may also epitomize what Professor Graham has 
tabbed a “bogus” variety of multiple admissibility, where nonevidence is 
transformed into a species of ill-defined evidence.113  An exhaustive survey 
of the cases and commentary construing Rule 703 is beyond our scope.114  
Rather, we will look to Rule 703 as perhaps the most spectacular example 
of limited admissibility’s flawed preoccupation with analytic precision and 
sophistic distinctions. 
This section begins with a brief discussion of Rule 703’s innovative 
origins and discusses several cases that illustrate its function at trial.  It then 
addresses the “emerging problems” that led to Rule 703’s amendment in 
2000 and its explicit embrace of limited admissibility in a manner that is 
doctrinally incoherent because of the ultimately inconsistent policies it 
serves.  In Part IV this essay discusses how amended Rule 703 provides an 
ethical firewall for counsel intent on exposing the jury to otherwise 
inadmissible evidence. 
A.  Rule 703:  Origins and Problems 
Rule 703 originated in a welcomed effort to smooth the common law’s 
rigid, formalistic approach to expert opinion testimony.115  The common 
law relentlessly protected the autonomy of the trier of fact from expert 
witnesses, at least in theory.  It did so first by permitting expert testimony 
only when it was necessary to assist the jury in its fact finding.  Second, and 
more important for our purposes, it demanded that any expert opinion rest 
on admissible evidence.116  Put differently, the expert’s opinion had to rest 
on the very same case-specific evidence that the jury itself would consider 
in deciding the facts.  Experts with personal knowledge (e.g., a doctor who 
examined the patient) could describe the facts observed.  Or an expert might 
 112. Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
 113. 21A Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5063, at 255. 
 114. See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Experts, Judges, and Commentators:  The 
Underlying Debate About an Expert’s Underlying Data, 47 Mercer L. Rev. 481 (1996) 
[hereinafter Carlson, Experts]; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert 
Testimony, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 577 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson, Policing]; Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Facts or Data” in Federal Rule of Evidence 703:  The 
Significance of the Supreme Court’s Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 Md. L. Rev. 352 (1995); Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible 
Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony:  A Response to Professor Carlson, 40 
Vand. L. Rev. 583 (1987). 
 115. See 1 McCormick on Evidence § 14, at 86–87 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
[hereinafter McCormick]. 
 116. See Rice, supra note 114, at 586–87; see also McCormick, supra note 115, §§ 13–
15. 
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sit through the trial listening to the same evidence as a jury.  The 
hypothetical question, however, served as the principle mechanism for 
enforcing the common law rule.  By tediously reciting each of the factual 
predicates upon which the expert opinion rested, the proponent served 
notice that each of these facts either was or would be introduced into 
evidence.  (The failure to do so opened the way for opposing counsel to 
have stricken the opinion testimony based on the hypothetical.)  The judge 
also instructed the jury that it should discard any expert opinion based on 
material facts that the jury rejected.117
The increasing use of expert testimony strained the common law’s rigid 
approach primarily because it was so out of tune with how such experts 
arrived at their opinions, whether in court or in their own practices.  The 
reality was that experts relied upon all sorts of case-specific information 
irrespective of its admissibility in the courtroom.118  Case law manifested 
the strains and attempted to accommodate the expert’s professional 
practices with evidence doctrine.119
Encompassing a “broader modern view,”120 Rule 703 permits expert 
opinion testimony predicated upon admissible or inadmissible evidence, 
provided it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in 
forming opinions or inferences on such matters.121  The rule sought to 
 117. See Giannelli, supra note 7, § 25.03[A], at 353. 
 118. For my effort to explain the common law background of Rule 703, see Daniel D. 
Blinka, “Practical Inconvenience” or Conceptual Confusion:  The Common-Law Genesis of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 20 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 467 (1997). 
 119. As explained in McCormick, 
[A]t common law an expert could base an opinion either on personally known 
facts or facts stated in an hypothesis.  However, those two bases do not exhaust the 
possibilities.  The expert could also attempt to rest an opinion on third party 
hearsay reports.  There formerly was a majority view, however, that a question is 
improper if it calls for the witness’s opinion on the basis of reports that are 
inadmissible in evidence under the hearsay rule.  The rationale for this view was 
that as a matter of logic, the jury could not accept the opinion based on the facts if 
the only evidence of the facts is inadmissible.  This view applied even when the 
witness was asked to give an opinion, not merely on the basis of reports of this 
kind, but on those matters supplemented by the witness’s own observations.  
However, there has been a strong case law trend toward a contrary view. 
McCormick, supra note 115, § 15, at 91 (citations omitted). 
 120. Id. § 15, at 92. 
 121. Fed. R. Evid. 703 states, 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.  Facts 
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
The first two sentences comprised the original rule.  The last sentence was added in 2000. 
See infra text accompanying notes 162–79. 
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conform expert practice and trial practice.122  The federal advisory 
committee explained that “the rule is designed to broaden the basis for 
expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the 
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when 
not in court.”123  Criticism that Rule 703 diluted, or perhaps eviscerated, 
exclusionary rules of evidence was misplaced, said the advisory committee 
in a single sentence that emoted Olympian detachment: 
 If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend to break 
down the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be taken that the rule 
requires that the facts or data “be of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field.”124
Precisely why or how the reasonable reliance element alone would thwart 
the “break down” of exclusionary rules was not explained.  Case law soon 
revealed the fundamental incompatibility of Rule 703’s reasonable reliance 
standard and exclusionary rules of evidence.  Several examples suffice. 
Hearsay problems predominate.  Ricciardi v. Children’s Hospital 
Medical Center125 provides a textbook illustration of adversarial ingenuity 
in applying multiple admissibility and limited admissibility while mining 
Rule 703’s potential for end runs around exclusionary rules.  After 
undergoing surgery to replace an aortic valve, Peter Ricciardi suffered 
neurological complications that he blamed on medical malpractice.  His 
“only proof of negligence” was a note in his medical chart written by a 
neurology resident, Dr. Krishna Nirmel, several days after the surgery.126  
The note said, “‘during surg. episode of aortic cannula accidently out x 40–
60 secs.’”127  Nirmel, however, had no personal knowledge of this 
“episode” and claimed not to “know where he obtained the information he 
 122. A leading authority explains the policy as follows: 
The rationale for this view is that an expert in a science is competent to judge the 
reliability of statements made to her by other investigators or technicians.  She is 
just as competent to do this as a judge and jury are to pass upon the credibility of 
an ordinary witness on the stand.  If the expert vouches that statements are the type 
of data which she would ordinarily rely on in the practice of her profession, they 
should be a sufficient basis for her professional opinion on the stand.  This 
argument has special force when the opinion is founded not only on reports but 
also in part on the expert’s firsthand observation.  The data gained by observation 
puts the expert in an even better position to evaluate the reliability of the 
statement. 
McCormick, supra note 115, at 92–93 (citations omitted). 
 123. Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee’s note.  The committee added an equally 
cryptic illustration:  “The language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion of 
an ‘accidentologist’ as to the point of impact in an automobile collision based on statements 
of bystanders since this requirement is not satisfied.” Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 811 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 126. Id. at 20. 
 127. Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained that “[a]n aortic 
cannula provides a means of circulating blood from the heart-lung machine back into the 
body when the heart is being bypassed for surgery.” Id. 
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recorded in the note.”128  Rather, Nirmel “assumed that he obtained the 
information from ‘professional people’” (nurses? staff?) involved in the 
surgery.129  In sum, Ricciardi’s medical malpractice case rested entirely on 
his ability to prove the truth of the “episode” described in Nirmel’s terse 
note.  In this he failed. 
Ricciardi first applied the principle of multiple admissibility with a 
seeming vengeance, asserting that Nirmel’s note was admissible under no 
less than five different hearsay exceptions.  The trial court rejected all five, 
however, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.  A 
brief summary is instructive.  The note failed to qualify under a state 
hospital records exception or under Rule 803(6) as a record of a regularly 
conducted activity primarily because Nirmel could not recall who provided 
the underlying information; thus, Ricciardi could not establish that it came 
from a hospital employee “with an obligation to supply” accurate 
information.130  Nor did the note qualify as a recorded recollection under 
Rule 803(5), which requires testimony by a witness who “once had 
knowledge.”131  Nirmel lacked personal knowledge of the surgery; the 
person possessing such knowledge was unknown and hence could not 
testify.132  Next, the First Circuit tersely rejected the note’s proffer under 
the residual exception to the hearsay rule because of obvious issues about 
“trustworthiness.”133  And, finally, the record was insufficient to admit the 
note as an “adoptive admission” by the surgeon who allegedly read the note 
without objecting to its accuracy.134
Ricciardi then turned to Rule 703, seeking “to have an expert witness, Dr. 
[Harold] Kay, rely on the statement to form an opinion that [the cannula 
came out during surgery].”135  More precisely, 
Dr. Kay told the court that if he could rely on Dr. Nirmel’s note, it would 
be his opinion that the cause of the embolus was that the cannula came 
out.  Otherwise, he would have to conclude, based on probabilities, that 
the cause was residual air being trapped.136
The trial judge ruled that Nirmel’s note was too unreliable to serve as a 
basis for Kay’s opinion.  The First Circuit found no abuse of discretion, but 
plainly struggled to support the ruling.  It conceded that “neurological 
consultation reports may well be the ‘type’ of records upon which an expert 
would reasonably rely,” yet emphasized that “there has been absolutely no 
showing here that unattributed material usually comprises a part of such 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 21–23. 
 131. Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). 
 132. Ricciardi, 811 F.2d at 23. 
 133. Id. at 23–24. 
 134. Id. at 24 (“[T]here is not a sufficient basis to conclude that Dr. Norwood read the 
note and under the circumstances would have objected to it if he did not think it were true.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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consultative reports, or that experts in the field would rely on this kind of a 
statement.”137  Kay himself admitted that he had never before “seen such a 
statement in a hospital chart” and described the note as “bizarre.”138  
Further complicating matters, another doctor, a pediatric neurologist, “said 
he did not have any doubt about what was written in the chart and that he 
accepted what Nirmel wrote ‘to be the truth as he has reported it to be.’”139  
Nonetheless, said the court, the record failed to “establish that experts 
reasonably would rely on the note about the cannula.”140
In sum, Ricciardi vividly illustrates how skilled trial lawyers use multiple 
avenues of admissibility to place critical evidence before the jury.  When 
Ricciardi swung and missed on five different hearsay exceptions, he facilely 
turned to Rule 703’s latitude in permitting experts to rely on inadmissible 
evidence (here, hearsay) in forming their opinion.  Interestingly, the 
expert’s (Kay’s) opinion offered little more than a paraphrase of the 
inadmissible hearsay.  In light of its holding, however, the First Circuit did 
not have to confront what Kay would have been permitted to tell the jury 
about the basis for his opinion had he reasonably relied on Nirmel’s note. 
In Sphere Drake Insurance v. Trisko,141 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit engaged the doctrinal messiness that occurs when the 
trial judge finds reasonable reliance under Rule 703.  Robert Trisko, who 
designed and sold jewelry, displayed his wares at several shows in Florida.  
He claimed that he carefully placed his jewelry in several suitcases, which 
he then put in the trunk of his rented Buick.  Although Trisko claimed that 
he and another employee maintained a vigilant watch on the car at all times, 
both suitcases (and the jewelry within) had vanished when they opened the 
trunk at the airport.  Trisko carried “Jewelers Block” insurance, which 
covered loss and damages but not an “unexplained loss” or “mysterious 
disappearance.”142  The insurer sought a declaratory judgment that Trisko’s 
loss was not covered. 
To prove he was the victim of a covered theft, Trisko introduced at trial 
the deposition of George Crowley, a Miami police detective, whose 
testimony sounded like a Damon Runyon novel.  Crowley educated the jury 
about property crime in the Miami area.  He also testified that two 
informants, identified only as “Hernando and Freddy,” told Crowley that 
“two individuals had been paid $20,000 each to steal Trisko’s jewelry.”143  
Based on Hernando and Freddy’s inside information, Crowley opined that 
 137. Id. at 25. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (explaining further that the pediatric neurologist “was not asked, however, 
whether he accepted the note about the cannula in particular, or whether he would rely on 
this type of note in forming an expert opinion”). 
 141. 226 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 142. Id. at 954.  The policy also excluded losses that occurred while jewelry was in a 
vehicle, unless Robert Trisko or his employees watched the vehicle. 
 143. Id.  At various points in the opinion the name is given as “Freddy” or “Freddie.” 
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“Trisko’s loss did not constitute a mysterious disappearance, but rather was 
likely a theft.”144  A jury found in Trisko’s favor. 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, upholding the admissibility of Crowley’s 
opinion as well as his testimony about its basis.  First, the court held that 
Crowley was properly qualified to offer expert opinion testimony “on theft 
in the Miami area.”145  His “specialized knowledge of jewel thieves and 
their methods of operation” together with his investigation of Trisko’s theft 
“afforded him distinct knowledge of this case outside of the jury’s common 
experience.”146  Second, Crowley properly relied upon Freddy and 
Hernando, whose statements would have been inadmissible hearsay had 
they “been introduced for their truth.”147  The court held that Rule 703 
permitted experts, like Crowley, “to rely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay 
in forming the basis of his opinion, so long as the hearsay is of the type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in his field.”148  Since the court had 
already found Crowley qualified as an expert theft investigator, it 
immediately followed that he reasonably relied upon statements by 
informants, such as Freddy and Hernando.149
Crowley thus both testified to his opinion that Trisko’s jewelry had been 
stolen and related the substance of Freddy and Hernando’s statements, 
namely, that several thieves had been paid handsomely to steal the jewelry.  
Significantly, the trial judge did not delete the references to the 
inadmissible hearsay or restrict Crowley to generic references that omitted 
the statements’ content.  The Eighth Circuit also upheld this exercise of 
discretion for several reasons.  First, experts “may ‘testify about facts and 
data outside of the record for the limited purpose of exposing the factual 
basis of the expert’s opinion.’”150  Second, the trial judge had 
specifically instructed the jury “to give no weight to the statements of 
Hernando or Freddie in the consideration of the issues in this case.  You 
are to consider that testimony only in developing what Detective Crowley 
did in the course of his investigation.”  Because the hearsay statements 
were not admitted for their truth, but rather only to inform the jury of the 
factual basis of Crowley’s expert opinion, they were properly admitted by 
the district court.151
Trisko, then, illustrates an almost glib use of limited admissibility in 
connection with Rule 703.  Trisko’s lawyer placed the content of Freddy 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 955. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id.  In context it seems that Trisko’s counsel made no pretense that Freddy and 
Hernando’s statements fell under some hearsay exception and thus could be used for their 
truth. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (“Crowley testified that he regularly relied on the statements of informants as an 
investigating officer.  He likewise was permitted to do so in forming the basis of his expert 
opinion.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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and Hernando’s statements before the jury with nary an argument that they 
fell within any hearsay exception (much less five as offered by the Ricciardi 
plaintiff).  The limiting instruction directed the jury “to give no weight” to 
the informants’ statements, but rather to consider them only in relation to 
the bases for Crowley’s opinion.152  Yet Crowley himself had obviously 
believed that Freddy and Hernando were truthful and correct about the theft, 
as there was no other basis for Crowley’s conclusion that a jewelry heist 
had occurred.  How then was the jury to assess the basis for Crowley’s 
opinion when it was specifically instructed that it could give no weight to 
the very informants’ statements on which Crowley’s conclusion depended?  
Indeed Crowley’s opinion testimony is little more than his attestation that 
he believed Freddy and Hernando’s hearsay account of how the theft 
occurred.  Yet far from subverting the hearsay rule, Trisko’s lawyer had 
skillfully employed the vagaries of Rule 703 and limited admissibility. 
Champions of the hearsay rule may view Rule 703 as their arch nemesis, 
but it must be appreciated that Rule 703 encompasses any ground of 
inadmissibility, not just hearsay.  Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft,153 which 
concerns inadmissible “other accident” evidence under Rule 404(b), is 
instructive. Plaintiffs brought a products liability action against the 
manufacturer of a private jet airplane that had crashed and killed all aboard.  
They alleged that the plane’s design “rendered it unsafe for flight in icing 
conditions.”154  To prove the unsafe design and causation, plaintiffs offered 
evidence that an identical plane had crashed in arguably similar flying 
conditions one year later in St. Anne, Illinois.  The trial judge ruled, 
however, that the two crashes were not sufficiently similar to warrant 
admissibility as permissible “other act” evidence under Rule 404(b).155
Thwarted on this theory of admissibility, plaintiff turned to Rule 703 
when he called an expert on aircraft design, Dr. Donald Kennedy, who 
opined that the aircraft was defectively designed.  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of the trial record reveals Rule 
703’s procedural awkwardness and policy shortcomings.  On direct 
examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked, “‘What, if anything, have you done, 
Dr. Kennedy, to strengthen the opinion that you hold and that you’ve 
expressed here today?’”156  On its face the question raised no substantive 
objection.157  Yet Kennedy’s response “that he had looked at other 
accidents involving the same or similar aircraft” obliquely spilled the 
inadmissible other accident evidence before the jury.158  Defense counsel 
 152. Id. 
 153. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 154. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1265. 
 155. Id. at 1269–70.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this 
ruling and found no abuse of discretion.  Although both crashes involved identical aircraft 
under icing conditions, the St. Anne’s crash involved no evidence of elevator failure. 
 156. Id. at 1270 n.11. 
 157. Arguably, the question called for a narrative response (i.e., it invited Dr. Donald 
Kennedy to deliver a lecture). 
 158. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1270 n.11. 
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then objected, a lengthy discussion ensued “outside the presence of the 
jury,” and the judge “sustained the defendant’s objection and disallowed the 
evidence.”159
Nachtsheim, then, illustrates that Rule 703 reaches all grounds of 
admissibility, including explosive character and other act evidence, not just 
hearsay.  Procedurally, Rule 703 is not self-enforcing.  Kennedy’s opinion 
testimony was admissible.  Moreover, there was no dispute about whether 
he had reasonably relied upon the St. Anne’s crash in reaching his opinion.  
Thus, it was permissible for him to discuss the St. Anne’s crash until the 
opponent objected.  And it was within the discretion of the trial judge to 
determine whether Kennedy could discuss the “inadmissible” St. Anne’s 
crash during his direct examination.160
The trilogy of Ricciardi, Trisko, and Nachtsheim illustrates Rule 703’s 
facility in permitting skilled lawyers to circumvent other exclusionary rules 
of evidence, whether hearsay or character/other act rules.  In Trisko, the 
proponent pushed Rule 703 and limited admissibility to its furthest 
doctrinal boundaries with great success, yet Ricciardi and Nachtsheim show 
how hard opposing counsel and the court must work in wrestling with a rule 
that is procedurally awkward, predicated upon questionable policy, and 
which invites proponents to end-run exclusionary rules. 
B.  “Emerging Problems” and the 2000 Amendment to Rule 703 
The difficulties posed by Rule 703 have not passed unnoticed.  
Commentators pointed to both theoretical and practical problems.  In 2000, 
the Supreme Court amended Rule 703 in an attempt to address these 
difficulties.  As amended, Rule 703 may well signal the high-water mark 
for limited admissibility as a bypass for exclusionary rules. 
The American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation (ABA) has closely 
monitored the Federal Rules of Evidence since their inception.161  In 
periodic studies bearing the title Emerging Problems Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, the ABA scrutinized each rule with an eye toward 
“unforeseen” problems and whether some were doing “more harm than 
good.”162  Rule 703 received lengthy, trenchant, and insightful criticism in 
1997.  The ABA study observed that “notwithstanding” the federal advisory 
committee’s self-satisfied assurance (quoted above) that Rule 703 would 
 159. Id.  Since the jury found in favor of defendant Beech Aircraft, there was no occasion 
to consider whether it had been prejudiced by Kennedy’s response despite the judge’s formal 
exclusion of the testimony and, one assumes, instruction to disregard the reference. 
 160. Id. at 1270–71.  The Seventh Circuit held that Rule 703 conveys a “flexible-liberal” 
discretionary authority in the trial judge to determine whether inadmissible bases should be 
“reveal[ed]” to the jury. Id. at 1271 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Seventh 
Circuit’s struggle with terminology—“reveals,” “admits,” “disclosure”—is discussed at infra 
note 198 and accompanying text. 
 161. ABA, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, at xiii (3d ed. 1998) 
[hereinafter Emerging Problems]. 
 162. Id. at xiv. 
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not become a hearsay sinkhole,163 “the courts have found that much 
hearsay, if reasonably relied upon by experts, may be used and disclosed as 
the basis for the expert’s opinion.”164  Reviewing several illustrative cases, 
the ABA study distinguished “between an expert who merely recites 
hearsay for the benefit of the jury and the expert who actually bases his or 
her opinion upon hearsay reasonably relied upon in the expert’s field.”165  
“The former type of testimony,” the ABA study reported, “is an 
impermissible abuse of Rule 703.”166  The study cautioned that Rule 703 
did not create a hearsay exception, ominously noting that no federal case to 
date had so held, yet it struggled to articulate how such evidence may be 
properly used, as illustrated in the following sentence: 
Even though an expert may rely on hearsay reasonably relied upon in the 
expert’s field, and may disclose it to the trier of fact for use in evaluating 
the weight to be given to the expert’s opinion, the hearsay is not generally 
considered to be admissible over objection as substantive evidence.167
The ABA study clearly labored to justify the distinction between uses.  It 
underscored that Rule 105 grants opponents the right to an instruction 
“limiting any inadmissible hearsay relied upon by an expert to its use in 
evaluating the expert’s opinion and prohibiting its use independently to 
prove the truth of any out-of-court assertions relied upon by the expert.”168  
But the study immediately conceded that “[t]he efficacy of such 
instructions . . . may be questionable.”169
The 1997 ABA study also noted the “sharp[] disagree[ment]” among 
scholarly commentators regarding Rule 703.170  Professor Ronald Carlson, 
for example, has long criticized the practice of allowing experts to disclose 
their inadmissible bases on direct examination.171  Such disclosures traduce 
exclusionary rules (hearsay especially).  Rule 703 permits the expert to rely 
on the inadmissible information and perhaps to identify the “sources” of her 
opinions, but no further detail is permissible (except on cross-
examination).172  Limiting instructions, warns Carlson, will not “take care 
of the problem” and may even have the “opposite effect” of underscoring 
the hearsay.173  In sum, “inadmissible” should mean just that.  At the 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 123–24. 
 164. Emerging Problems, supra note 161, at 228. 
 165. Id. at 229. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  Truly noteworthy is the committee’s caveat about the need for a hearsay 
objection.  As a matter of doctrine, Rule 703 did not create a hearsay exception, but 
commentators’ frequent felt need to so proclaim underscores the risk that it often functions 
precisely in that fashion. 
 168. Id. at 230. 
 169. Id. at 231 (citation omitted). 
 170. Id. at 232 (citing and discussing the divergent views on Rule 703 by Professors 
Ronald Carlson and Paul Rice). 
 171. See Carlson, Policing, supra note 114, at 585. 
 172. Id. at 584–85. 
 173. See Carlson, Experts, supra note 114, at 485. 
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opposite pole, Professor Paul Rice has acknowledged the “charade” created 
by Rule 703 but strenuously argues that the expert’s reasonable reliance 
should be sufficient to permit substantive use of (otherwise inadmissible) 
hearsay.174
Returning to the 1997 ABA study, it closed by acknowledging the risk of 
abuse while conceding that the prevalence of misuse is undetermined.175  
The study did not explicitly endorse an amendment to Rule 703 as 
necessary or even desirable, but it acknowledged the seriousness of the 
problem and hoped that limiting instructions combined with Rule 403 
would suffice. 
Those calling for textual change eventually won out.  In 2000, Rule 703 
was amended by adding the following final sentence:  “Facts or data that 
are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion 
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.”176  The added language, 
explained the advisory committee, “emphasize[s] that when an expert 
reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an opinion or 
inference, the underlying information is not admissible simply because the 
opinion or inference is admitted.”177  Or is it? 
Protestations to the contrary, amended Rule 703 performed like the 
legendary alchemist’s stone, transforming inadmissible evidence into a 
species of admissible evidence.  The transformation occurred first in the 
new text of Rule 703, which reframed the issue as the disclosure of 
“otherwise inadmissible” evidence.178  Amended Rule 703 guarded against 
“potential misuse,” concluded the advisory committee, by two means.  
First, the new rule only permits disclosure “if the trial court finds that the 
probative value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the 
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”179  Bluntly 
stated, Rule 703 “provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury.”180  
Second, should the trial judge permit disclosure, opposing counsel can 
claim the protections of Rule 105, which requires the trial judge to give a 
 174. Rice, supra note 114, at 587 (hearsay exception), 596 (“charade”). 
 175. Emerging Problems, supra note 161, at 232 (quoting a memorandum by Professor 
Daniel Capra, the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules). 
 176. Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
 177. Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee’s note (amended 2000). 
 178. Fed. R. Evid. 703 (emphasis added).  The complete text of Federal Rule of Evidence 
703 appears at supra note 121.  The second sentence of current Rule 703 speaks of an 
expert’s reliance on evidence that “need not be admissible,” but the third sentence uses the 
telling phrase “otherwise inadmissible.”  The Advisory Committee’s choice represents an 
apparent compromise between critics who argued against any disclosure on direct 
examination and those who advocated that an expert’s reasonable reliance sufficed to admit 
the evidence, particularly over hearsay objections. See Emerging Problems, supra note 161, 
at 232–33 (discussing other proposals, including state revisions to Rule 703 that were more 
heavily weighted against disclosure). 
 179. Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee’s note (amended 2000). 
 180. Id. 
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“limiting instruction upon request.”181  It was, however, left to the trial 
court to consider “the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness” of 
such instructions under the “particular circumstances.”182  As we have seen, 
the two safeguards are integrally related and the ruling ultimately driven, 
one suspects, by the judge’s assessment of a limiting instruction.  A judge 
satisfied that the instruction is adequate will likely conclude that the 
presumption against disclosure has been overcome. 
In sum, amended Rule 703 reconceptualizes the disclosure issue as a 
problem of limited admissibility.  Prior to 2000, the dilemma had been what 
to do with the expert who reasonably relied on inadmissible evidence.  
After 2000, Rule 703 reformulated the problem as the expert’s reasonable 
reliance on “otherwise” inadmissible evidence.  Proponents need no longer 
struggle to explain why they should be permitted to pour inadmissible 
evidence into the trial record; the expert’s reasonable reliance effectively 
means the evidence is now “otherwise admissible” to help the jury better 
understand the expert’s reasoning and conclusion. 
C.  Postcript:  Post-2000 Problems 
It is beyond the scope of our purpose to consider the efficacy of amended 
Rule 703, but several points are in order.  First, the new language seems 
overly preoccupied with hearsay issues.  Rule 703 permits experts’ reliance 
on evidence that is “inadmissible” under any exclusionary rule; hearsay 
may be the most common affliction, but it is not the sole ground for 
exclusion.183  Nor does inadmissible hearsay always pose the greatest risk 
of unfairness.184  Second, and related, amended Rule 703 has formally 
embraced all the doctrinal shortcomings and baggage associated with 
limited admissibility, including the very real question of whether the 
purported distinctions between permissible and impermissible uses are 
meaningful in themselves and adequately expressed in a limiting 
instruction. 
At this stage it is too early to tell whether amended Rule 703 has had any 
pronounced effect on trial practice.  Has the asserted “presumption” against 
disclosure for limited purposes resulted in fewer rulings permitting 
disclosure for the limited purpose of better understanding the expert’s 
reasoning?  It seems unlikely, for example, that Sphere Drake Insurance v. 
Trisko would have come out differently under the present rule.185  The trial 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  The Advisory Committee repeatedly distinguishes between evidence that is not 
admissible for “substantive purposes” but which may be admissible to assist the jury in 
weighing the expert’s opinion.  The distinction is apt in the hearsay context but lacks 
efficacy when considering evidence excluded under the other acts doctrine, for example. 
 184. For example, inadmissible character and propensity evidence may pose a far greater 
danger of misuse. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 4.11 (3d 
ed. 2003). 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 141–51. 
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judge found that the jury needed to hear Hernando and Freddy’s statements 
to the detective.  The limiting instruction told the jury to give the statements 
“no weight” except as it “inform[ed]” them of the factual basis for 
Detective Crowley’s expert opinion that the jewelry had been stolen (just as 
Hernando and Freddy said it had).186  The jury’s need for the evidence 
would likely have “substantially outweigh[ed] the[] prejudicial effect”187 of 
the hearsay in light of the courts’ faith in limiting instructions. 
Proponents seeking disclosure of “otherwise inadmissible” evidence on 
direct examination seemed to have gained the most from amended Rule 
703’s explicit embrace of limited admissibility, which makes such 
arguments much more straightforward than before 2000.  Yet the new 
language may have the unintended effect of creating new avenues for 
excluding expert opinion testimony altogether.  Where an expert’s opinion 
rests primarily on inadmissible evidence that does not warrant disclosure 
under amended Rule 703, some courts have precluded not just the 
proponent’s use of such evidence on direct examination but have also 
excluded the expert’s opinion itself, which would otherwise serve only as a 
hearsay conduit.188
IV.  ETHICAL FIREWALLS AND RULE 703 
Need trial lawyers apologize for using Rule 703 to disclose inadmissible 
evidence?  More to the point, is this unethical or unprofessional conduct 
that opens the lawyer to sanctions or disciplinary rebuke?  Pulling together 
the strands of ethics, evidence doctrine, and trial practice, this section 
focuses on how Rule 703 and limited admissibility provide at least two 
ethical firewalls that insulate against charges of impropriety.  Both firewalls 
are made of the same stuff:  the assumption that parties will use evidence 
 186. Sphere Drake Ins. v. Trisko, 226 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 187. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 188. See Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 
2003) (citing amended Rule 703, the trial court properly precluded an arson expert from 
testifying that the fire was intentionally set where the opinion rested almost exclusively on 
an inadmissible laboratory report which found that gasoline had been poured into the soil in 
question).  In a sense, Turner conflicts with Rule 703, which explicitly permits an expert to 
base an opinion on inadmissible evidence that is of a type reasonably relied upon by such 
experts in the field.  Thus, the judge could have permitted the opinion but not a full 
explanation of its bases.  Obviously this result troubled the Turner court.  While the 
proponent would have liked to disclose the content of the laboratory report (for whatever 
purpose), the opinion alone satisfied its prima facie burden.  And opposing counsel would 
not dream of cross-examining the expert about his bases because this would open the door to 
the “otherwise inadmissible” laboratory report.  Yet if the cross-examiner says nothing about 
the expert’s bases, during argument the proponent can rightfully refer to its expert’s 
“unchallenged findings” that the fire was caused by arson. 
It is too early to tell, but Turner may embody a new line of cases which hold that the 
expert’s opinion must be predicated on facts and data that are sufficiently compelling to 
warrant disclosure under amended Rule 703, assuming they are not admissible in the first 
instance.  Such a construction, however, seems in conflict with amended Rule 703 and a 
throwback to the common law stance that the expert’s bases must be admissible. See supra 
text accompanying notes 115–19. 
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rules in an adversarial manner to promote their clients’ best interest.  In 
elaborating upon this point, we will draw upon the earlier examples in 
Ricciardi, Trisko, and Nachtsheim.  Our focus will be on the proponent of 
the evidence, as Rule 705 accords opposing counsel virtually free rein to 
cross-examine an expert about anything, admissible or inadmissible, upon 
which an opinion is based.189
The first firewall is the threshold issue of whether the underlying 
evidence is admissible or inadmissible.  The law places the burden on the 
opponent to object in a timely and reasonably specific manner.  Absent a 
proper objection, the opponent waives the error.190  Thus, if opposing 
counsel in Ricciardi had failed to object properly to Nirmel’s note on 
hearsay grounds, its contents would have been admissible as substantive 
evidence and the jury would have been instructed to give it whatever weight 
it deemed appropriate.191  The proponent displayed imagination, creativity, 
and skill in arguing that Nirmel’s note was admissible under any one of five 
different hearsay exceptions, which in turn provoked more objections by 
opposing counsel, who was equally skilled in the ways of hearsay.  While 
the court rejected all five hearsay theories of admissibility, there was no 
intimation that proponent’s contentions were frivolous.  In cases like 
Ricciardi, the ground of exclusion is so obvious and the evidence so critical 
that only legal malpractice would likely account for a failure to raise the 
objection, but in other cases opposing counsel may forgo it for tactical 
reasons or because she simply missed it.192  The point is simply that 
evidence only becomes “inadmissible” as a result of a timely objection and 
ruling by the court.  From the proponent’s perspective, there is no harm in 
trying. 
Limited admissibility comprises the second ethical firewall.  Saddled 
with rulings that their critical evidence was inadmissible, the proponents in 
Ricciardi, Trisko, and Nachtsheim all held a critical evidentiary card:  each 
had experts who, they believed, would testify that the evidence was of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.193  In Nachtsheim an 
expert on aircraft design was deemed to have reasonably relied upon 
inadmissible evidence of another airplane crash.194  Trisko nicely illustrates 
how easily the standard is met.  The expert, Detective Crowley, “testified 
 189. See Fed. R. Evid. 705; see also Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee’s note 
(amended 2000) (“Nothing in this Rule restricts the presentation of underlying expert facts 
or data when offered by an adverse party.”). 
 190. See 21 Wright & Graham, supra note 3, § 5037. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 125–34. 
 192. Blinka, supra note 4, at 32–33. 
 193. In Ricciardi the court held that reasonable reliance had not been established, 
although its analysis seems a bit strained. See 811 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1987); see supra text 
accompanying notes 136–40. 
 194. See Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270–71 (7th Cir. 1988).  
Reasonable reliance was apparently not disputed.  Rather, the issue centered on whether the 
plaintiff’s expert should have been permitted to discuss the inadmissible other accident 
evidence on direct examination. 
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that he regularly relied on the statements of informants as an investigating 
officer.”195  This simple foundation is all that Rule 703 demands.  One 
suspects that parties hiring experts have few difficulties establishing that the 
expert “regularly” or “customarily” relies on the type of evidence in 
question, whether inadmissible hearsay or other act evidence.196
Once reasonable reliance is established, the proponents inevitably argue 
for disclosure of inadmissible evidence for the limited purpose of 
explaining or clarifying the expert’s opinion.  Prior to 2000, courts 
struggled to conceptualize the status of inadmissible expert bases, ranging 
among words like “reveal,” “disclose,” and “admit.”197  Amended Rule 
703, as we have seen, drained the doctrinal quagmire by transforming the 
inadmissible bases into ones that are “otherwise inadmissible” and 
safeguarding against abuses by presumptively precluding disclosure by 
proponents.  More to the point, proponents are no longer forced to argue 
awkwardly that their expert’s “inadmissible” bases should nonetheless be 
“disclosed” to the jury for some ill-defined other (often meaningless) 
purpose.  Rather, those bases are now just “otherwise inadmissible” and 
proponents will argue that Rule 105 and a limiting instruction provide the 
time-honored remedies against potential unfairness.  Limited admissibility, 
then, defuses the presumption against disclosure.  The burden is effectively 
shifted to opposing counsel to explain why she is not adequately protected 
by a limiting instruction.  Alternatively, opposing counsel may argue that 
the expert’s testimony should be confined to a generic or otherwise oblique 
reference to the offending evidence (not all the details), but this too may 
prove elusive. 
Once again Trisko illustrates these points, underscoring that Trisko’s 
lawyer did not behave unethically or unprofessionally in any sense by 
spilling inadmissible hearsay before the jury.  As argued above, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that Trisko comes out differently under 
amended Rule 703.  A trial judge convinced that the jury should hear what 
informants Freddy and Hernando told the detective about the theft and that 
a limiting instruction is adequate, even if nonsensical, to protect against 
 195. Sphere Drake Ins. v. Trisko, 226 F.3d 951, 955 (8th Cir. 2000).  It is unclear whether 
Trisko formally retained Detective George Crowley for his testimony or whether the latter 
was deposed in his capacity as the investigating detective in the case, in which event 
Crowley’s assertions of reasonable reliance may have carried greater weight with the judge. 
 196. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations § 9.03[4][c] (6th ed. 2005).  
The reasonable reliance standard itself is subject to competing authority, with some cases 
evoking a liberal approach that largely defers to experts and others a more restrictive 
approach that permits the judge to override a compliant expert where reliability is an issue.  
See Emerging Problems, supra note 161, at 225–27. 
 197. For example, in Nachtsheim the Seventh Circuit lurched back and forth among 
different characterizations:  (1) “whether the expert may reveal,” (2) whether “materials 
independently excluded” by another rule will be “admitted under Rule 703,” (3) the trial 
judge’s power “to permit an expert witness to testify about otherwise inadmissible facts,” 
and, again, (4) whether the judge, in her discretion may “allow the expert to reveal to the 
jury the information gained from the expert’s pretrial studies and investigations.” 847 F.2d at 
1270–71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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unfairness will likely rule the same way.  In light of the trial court’s wide 
discretion and Rule 703’s open invitation to launder inadmissible evidence 
into a species of admissible evidence, why would a proponent forgo the 
opportunity?  Here too the burden is on the opponent to object that she is 
not protected by a limiting instruction or that the inadmissible bases should 
be edited or redacted in some fashion to minimize the harm, but even this 
may be insufficient.198
In sum, Rule 703 fully embodies the adversary ethic.  It provides two 
ethical and evidentiary firewalls for proponents seeking to expose the jury 
to problematic evidence.  First, fundamental trial procedure places the 
burden on opposing counsel to properly object, absent which the 
problematic evidence is admissible.  Second, Rule 703 transforms 
inadmissible evidence into “otherwise inadmissible” evidence provided the 
proponent’s expert testifies that it is the “type” of information upon which 
she regularly, usually, or customarily relies in forming opinions—a low 
barrier indeed.  This simple foundation opens the way to a request for 
complete disclosure of the problematic evidence subject to a limiting 
instruction that a jury may likely find so baffling that it will be ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
Ambiguity about the core concept of admissibility yields, unsurprisingly, 
ethical ambivalence by lawyers applying evidence rules in an adversary 
trial.  The issue is not whether trial lawyers abuse the doctrine of limited 
admissibility.  As we have seen, it is a doctrine that invites abuse through 
clever, overly refined, sometimes sophistic distinctions that are designed to 
elide exclusionary rules.  The objective is to expose the jury to the 
evidence, trusting that twelve people with common sense will draw all 
reasonable inferences regardless of a limiting instruction, and especially 
when the limiting instruction is incomprehensible.  So long as evidence law 
harbors, and indeed blesses, such evasions, why would skilled trial lawyers 
not use the doctrine to full advantage? 
From this, several suggestions follow.  First, there is a need to revisit 
many of the distinctions now recognized by evidence law.  Does public 
policy justify them?  Are the distinctions coherent and meaningful, or are 
they so diaphanous as to be meaningless and unintelligible, particularly 
when presented to laypeople?  The goal is not to turn the clock back to 
rigid, paternalistic exclusionary rules, but to better appreciate that tortured 
distinctions that consume hours of class time in evidence courses are likely 
more problematic, and more damaging, in a trial. 
 198. For example, in Trisko, the judge may have ruled that Detective Crowley could only 
testify that his opinion was founded on “information he received from his informants, Freddy 
and Hernando.” 226 F.3d at 951.  One suspects that a jury would quickly fill in the blanks 
when Crowley testifies, “Based on my conversation with two reliable informants, Freddy 
and Hernando, I concluded that the jewelry had been stolen.” Id. 
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Second, in rethinking applications of limited admissibility, we must look 
to the trial.  Certainly limiting instructions need to be redrawn, but the 
suggestion here is more than a plea for “better” instructions.  Rather, the 
distinctions harbored by the sundry rules must be meaningful, justified by 
public policy, and comprehensible to laypersons.  In short, if we cannot 
intelligibly explain the concept to the average person, it may not be worth 
maintaining. 
Finally, putting to one side the nettlesome issues about limiting 
instructions, we should pay more attention to arguments by counsel.  The 
real impact of a ruling that limits the use of evidence may be its effect on 
closing arguments.  Jurors are far less likely to embrace a prohibited 
purpose (though one may assume they will recognize it) if the parties’ 
lawyers are not, in effect, beseeching them to do so.  Here, too, the key is a 
doctrine that embraces coherent, rational distinctions. 
Our experience with Rule 703 embodies many of these lessons.  
Although improved by the 2000 amendment, the rule is still flaccid.  The 
range of inadmissible evidence extends to all evidentiary pitfalls.  Rule 703 
should be rethought to consider whether, for example, inadmissible 
character and other act evidence pose far more significant risks of misuse 
than hearsay.  In determining an expert’s reasonable reliance, the judge 
should play an active, autonomous, gate-keeping role that recognizes that 
her responsibilities at trial are as important a consideration as how the 
expert usually uses such inadmissible evidence in his own calling.199 
Disclosure on direct examination should be restricted to “otherwise 
inadmissible” hearsay evidence at most; it should not extend to 
inadmissible character evidence, for example.  Generally, the proponent 
should not be permitted to disclose the inadmissible evidence in any detail, 
although a generic reference, “I reviewed affidavits,” may be appropriate.  
In those instances where the proponent convinces the trial judge that the 
need for, and reliability of, the information is so compelling as to overcome 
the presumption against any disclosure, Rule 703 may work in tandem with 
Rule 807 (the residual hearsay exception) to permit the jury to consider the 
evidence for the very same purpose as the expert did.200  In short, where 
warranted, evidence doctrine should properly recognize the critical roles 
played by the Hernandos and Freddys of the world rather than contenting 
itself with a silly, pointless legal fiction that invites abuse of and, worse, 
disrespect for a trial system that strives very hard to get at the truth. 
 
 199. Carlson, Policing, supra note 114, at 582–83. 
 200. See Rice, supra note 114, at 591. 
